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التبادل الاعلاني
منع النسخ

the limits of cultural globalisation

اذهب الى الأسفل

the limits of cultural globalisation

مُساهمة من طرف abderrahim في الثلاثاء مايو 24, 2011 4:20 pm

Setting the right time scale, resisting global primordialism
Possibly the greatest obstacle in the study of globalisation is the terminological chaos
surrounding not merely the definition of globalisation but its very time span and
duration. In fact, I argue that the two are closely interrelated. If we do not know when
globalisation began, then we are unable to understand what globalisation is. For, if we
think, as some authors do, that the Roman Empire entailed forms of globalisation, what
use is such an expanded definition of the concept for understanding our present
predicament? Similarly, what is the usefulness of arguing that Genghis Khan, ‘the world
conqueror’ and ‘the emperor of all men’, inaugurated the pattern of ‘modern’
globalisation (Weatherford, 2004, p.16), if not to de-historicize the concept? Why should
long-distance contact during late antiquity be described as ‘incipient globalisation’
(Harris 2007)? In this vein, even the Neolithic age could be invoked to promote an
enlarged version of globalisation. We can indefinitely shift back the rise of globalisation to
the expansion of the first forms of plankton ‘colonizing’ the planet.
Borrowing from the nationalist studies literature, this backward looking attitude
can be defined as ‘primordialism’. Primordialism is the claim that modern entities and
institutions, particularly nations and ethnic communities, originate back in the distant
past as intrinsic, given features of human societies (Horowitz, 2004), often based on
factual 'lines of physical descent' (Smith 1998, p.192), also cited in (Brown 2000, p.164).
Most ‘primordialists’ are nationalists themselves and have vested interests in exaggerating
or falsifying the origins of their nations, while imagining thousand-year continuities and,
eventually, describing national communities as ‘natural’ forms of human organization.
The related concept of perennialism can also be used to identify a community, institution
or phenomenon as immemorial and everlasting “insofar as recurrent instances of this
formation could be found in various periods of history and in different continents”
(Smith 1998, p.190). Although not all primordialists and perennialists are nationalists,
they share a common perception that nations and nationhood are pre-political and
ancient. And, although some comparative historians concur in stretching the rise of
Journal of Critical Globalisation Studies , Issue 3 (2010)
38
nations before modernity (Hastings, 1997), the majority of ‘primordialists’ work from
within other disciplines, or entirely outside academia. These are important, yet often
unnoticed, parallels between the use and abuse of key concepts within both nationalism
studies and globalisation studies.2
Although its roots can be traced back to the political economic choices
inaugurated by the Bretton Woods agreement in 1944 (Korten, 2001), globalisation as
such is more recent: Bretton Woods set the basis for the International Monetary Fund
(IMF, f. 1944) and the World Bank (f. 1944), establishing, in the IMF’s own words, a
system of “global surveillance activities” (IMF 2007). In Western Europe, the Marshall
Plan (1947–51) pushed for the transfer of the US industrial management model
(Kipping and Bjarnar 1998). As argued by Saskia Sassen (1996, p.20):
The most widely recognized instance of Americanisation is seen… in the
profound influence U.S. popular culture exerts on global culture. But it has also
become very clear in the legal forms ascendant in international business
transactions. Through the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD), as well as the GATT, the U.S. vision has spread to -
some would say been imposed on - the developing world”.3
As is known, these initial agreements were implemented during different stages, rather
than suddenly. In the wake of Reagan’s mid-1980s deregulation campaign, the
consumer’s legal protections established approximately since the Progressive Era
(1890s–1920s) were dramatically reversed. After the 1970s energy crisis, studies
sponsored by various institutions in the US, like the American Enterprise Institute and
the Brookings Institution, began to preach deregulation at all levels of society. Since the
1980s, famous economists like Milton Friedman advocated a global, free market ‘shock
doctrine’ (Klein, 2007). Although Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter all played a part in
advancing ‘trade liberalisation’, it was under the Reagan presidency that the doctrinaire
and global character of deregulation became explicit and inflexible. Ideologically based on
a further reduction of government spending and state regulation of the economy,
‘Reaganomics’ was advanced during the Cold War by all the above international
institutions. Structural adjustment loans (SALs) were used to “blast open Third World
economies once "the Reagan Administration came to power with an agenda to discipline
the Third World" ” (Bello, 1999, p.27; See also p.16).
The process continued under George H.W. Bush. During the Clinton
presidency, globalisation accelerated and expanded so aggressively that voices of concern
began to coalesce and organize throughout the world, by articulating popular movements
as in Seattle and elsewhere (Gill, 2000; Halliday, 2000; Kaldor, 2000; Scholte, 2000).
Most importantly, hard science began to highlight the catastrophic impact of
The Limits of Cultural Globalisation?, Conversi
39
globalisation on climate change (Barkin 2003; Depardon and Virilio 2008; Lipschutz &
Peck, 2009).4 But this global opposition was indefinitely halted during the ‘War on
Terror’, which froze debate and distracted public opinion into a global security scare
(Lipschutz, 2009; Lustick, 2006), reinforcing the already present totalitarian drift of
globalisation (Barber, 1996). American-led globalisation then turned into war (Barkawi,
2006), with its indissociable component of cultural hegemony (Bartholomew 2006). For
Stieger (2005a, p.xii), “the remarkable merger of Clintonian neo-liberalism and the Bush
administration neoconservative security agenda marked the birth of imperial globalism.
Indeed, after 9/11, the link between globalism and the U.S. empire became apparent to
the rest or the world in a stark new light”. Globalism’s agenda became less ‘hidden’ and
the humiliation suffered by many victims of the ‘war on terror’ prompted early calls for
global revenge, which in turn reinforced the spread of media-induced obsessive delusions
(Smith, 2006). Residual cosmopolitan hopes waned as post 9-11 globalisation oscillated
between obeisance to US diktats and open anti-Americanism. In turn, this prompted a
larger nationalistic backlash which ripped Europe at its core.
The impact of Reaganomics on cultural practices was perhaps even more
extensive than in the economic and financial fields. In Reagan’s years, the robust nexus
between politics, economics, military and the expansion of mass consumerism was
amplified through the media industry (Barber, 2008; Moffitt, 1987). For some, 1985
became a watershed year for global Americanisation or, at least, a rapid acceleration in
trend (Hilger, 2008; Schröter, 2008a), but the same trend was experienced at different
times and levels in different countries. Global deregulation led to the collapse of native
film industries, which in most European and many Asian countries began to be massively
replaced by products launched in the US via mass distribution agencies. Thus the 1980s
marked “a period of pivotal transformation for the media industry”, as “Hollywood
embraced the global marketplace and came to depend on this market to recoup spiralling
production costs” (Holt, 2002, p.26).5 However, this sort of ‘revolution’ began to affect
most other forms of popular expression through a ‘culture-ideology of consumerism’
(Sklair, 2001, p.255-301), which, for some authors, was bent on destroying democracy at
its very core (Barber, 2008). The ideological content of globalisation and its various
offshoots, like consumerism, is addressed in the next section. In some countries,
deregulation prompted the collapse of the local creative industries and their replacement
by media monopolies under US supervision, like in Berlusconi’s Italy (Ginsborg, 2004;
Gray, 1996; Hopkin, 2005; Pasquino, 2005).6
To sum up, I have stressed that the inception of cultural globalisation can be
dated back to various post-war periods, but the 1980s should be particularly stressed as a
time when deregulation of the entertainment industry rapidly accelerated, increasing its
dependency on foreign markets in order to compensate for the high production costs
and the diminution of support at home.
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abderrahim
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ذكر عدد المساهمات : 61
تاريخ الميلاد : 10/11/1975
تاريخ التسجيل : 10/12/2010
العمر : 42

الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة اذهب الى الأسفل

رد: the limits of cultural globalisation

مُساهمة من طرف أبو يحيى في الثلاثاء مايو 24, 2011 4:40 pm

ach hadchi
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أبو يحيى
سوسيولوجي نشيط
سوسيولوجي نشيط

ذكر عدد المساهمات : 154
تاريخ الميلاد : 15/03/1979
تاريخ التسجيل : 05/11/2010
العمر : 39

الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة اذهب الى الأسفل

رد: the limits of cultural globalisation

مُساهمة من طرف abderrahim في الثلاثاء مايو 24, 2011 4:43 pm

dakechi
geek
orale dial anglais
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abderrahim
سوسيولوجي مشارك
سوسيولوجي مشارك

ذكر عدد المساهمات : 61
تاريخ الميلاد : 10/11/1975
تاريخ التسجيل : 10/12/2010
العمر : 42

الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة اذهب الى الأسفل

رد: the limits of cultural globalisation

مُساهمة من طرف أبو يحيى في الثلاثاء مايو 24, 2011 4:54 pm

wach khasna nhafdoh wla chno
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أبو يحيى
سوسيولوجي نشيط
سوسيولوجي نشيط

ذكر عدد المساهمات : 154
تاريخ الميلاد : 15/03/1979
تاريخ التسجيل : 05/11/2010
العمر : 39

الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة اذهب الى الأسفل

رد: the limits of cultural globalisation

مُساهمة من طرف الحسن سلمي في الأربعاء مايو 25, 2011 9:08 am

الامتحان شفوي ستطلب منكم الأستاذة اختيار أحد النصوص الثلاثة ثم تطلب منكم قراءة بعض الفقرات ثم سوف تطرح بعض أسئلة الفهم
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الحسن سلمي
سوسيولوجي نشيط
سوسيولوجي نشيط

ذكر عدد المساهمات : 170
تاريخ الميلاد : 19/04/1978
تاريخ التسجيل : 06/11/2010
العمر : 40

الرجوع الى أعلى الصفحة اذهب الى الأسفل

رد: the limits of cultural globalisation

مُساهمة من طرف oumalaeddine في الخميس مايو 26, 2011 4:13 am

salam cvrai qu'on va choisir???merci
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oumalaeddine
سوسيولوجي نشيط
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انثى عدد المساهمات : 118
تاريخ الميلاد : 28/09/1982
تاريخ التسجيل : 04/01/2011
العمر : 35

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